House debates

Wednesday, 15 February 2006

Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal of Ministerial Responsibility for Approval of Ru486) Bill 2005

Second Reading

9:24 pm

Photo of Greg HuntGreg Hunt (Flinders, Liberal Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage) Share this | Hansard source

In rising to address the Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal of Ministerial responsibility for approval of RU486) Bill 2005, I want to begin in my electorate of Flinders, in the towns of Somerville and Somers, in Mt Martha, in the towns of Rosebud, Rye and Dromana and in all of those areas such as Kooweerup, Cowes and Lang Lang, from which people have contacted me. There has been a wide debate in my electorate. It is a debate which has been characterised by a difference of views, but a respectful difference of views. I thank all of those constituents who have contacted me, with both information and their views, and their views have to a person been heartfelt and sincere. I know by definition that it is impossible for any member of this House to satisfy all constituents, so I acknowledge that the decision that I take and announce tonight must by definition disappoint some constituents. But I say that I make it having listened carefully to all of their views, having respected their views, but having ultimate responsibility to my own conscience and my own judgment. For that I take full responsibility.

At its absolute core, the debate on this bill is about allowing the potential extension of methods of termination from surgical termination to a combination of surgical and medical termination if the Therapeutic Goods Administration were to authorise the use of the abortifacient RU486. In addressing that question and in expressing my support for the proposition that medical termination should be made available in Australia subject to the approval of the Therapeutic Goods Administration, I come to this on the basis of having assessed four issues: firstly, the nature of the debate; secondly, the nature of assessment of health and safety; thirdly, the philosophical questions which are implicit in this debate; and, fourthly, the question of parliamentary sovereignty.

Let me turn to the first of those issues, the nature of this debate. Within Australia today I believe this has been a well-conducted debate. Around the world the question of abortion, or of any extension to the available methods of termination, in many situations has not been characterised by the civility which has generally been shown in Australia during the course of the last few months. For all of the disagreement and for all of the contest, we must recognise that we as a society have handled what is one of the most difficult issues with an extraordinary amount of good grace, good faith and good conduct.

Having said that, I wish to take argument with two points that have been raised about the rights and nature of the process of debate. The first is the idea that has been presented that men have no place in the consideration of this issue. I disagree. This and all other ethical and moral questions within our society are fundamentally the province of the parliament. I reject the notion that this debate is no place for men in the same way that I reject the notion that there is no place for women in consideration of the question of male suicide. I reject the notion that in consideration of a certain question there could be no place for people because they are atheists or Catholics. In the entrance to the Victorian parliament there is a mosaic, and that mosaic quotes from Proverbs 11:14. It reads:

Where no counsel is, the people fall: but in the multitude of counsellors there is safety.

That principle I believe has been applied and should be applied. Every person, irrespective of race, creed, party or gender has a right to participate in this and every other debate within the parliament. The second issue on which I wish to dispute some of the points raised about conduct in this debate is that this is in some way a vote of no confidence in the Minister for Health and Ageing, Tony Abbott. I reject that view entirely. My decision, and I believe the decisions of colleagues on both sides of the chamber, would have been no different no matter who was the minister or when the debate was had. I express my absolute belief in the capacity and the integrity of Minister Abbott. My respect for him simply could not be higher.

This brings me to the substantive issues in the debate, the first of which is the question of safety and efficacy. The Therapeutic Goods Administration is charged with monitoring and reviewing risks associated with the possible importation and licensing of any drug. The standing and status of this organisation has been called into question by some. That is regrettable. It is an expert body comprised of highly reputable, highly respected and highly experienced professionals. There has been general agreement within the debate in this House that the Therapeutic Goods Administration’s capacity to assess the pure health and safety issues is largely unquestioned. They have a right, a capacity and they have the responsibility under law to be the national custodians for establishing the health and safety of not just this but any other drug. The health and safety assessment should be carried out by the properly authorised and constituted expert body. That body is the Therapeutic Goods Administration.

But that is not the end of the debate, because that brings us to the philosophical or moral question in relation to the abortifacient RU486. Here I differ from many of my colleagues on either side of the House who assert that this debate is not a moral debate; that it is simply a question about process. I reject that notion, because to change the current laws, which allow termination under circumstances generally agreed in jurisdictions around Australia, is a key question which has been implicitly at issue in some of this debate. I would say that most people have decided that the general proposition that the laws should not be changed is an acceptable position. For myself, for reasons of safety and choice, I support the current laws in relation to the access and choice questions between a woman and her doctor.

But this leads to the second philosophical question, which is implicit and direct and at the heart of this bill and this debate about access to RU486: even if it is found to be safe by the Therapeutic Goods Administration, should parliament authorise, in terms of the morality and ethics of the issue, an extension of the methods for achieving a termination to include medical termination? That is the essence of this debate. If the Therapeutic Goods Administration finds that the use of RU486 is acceptable, should the parliament authorise the extension of the methods available for termination to include RU486 as a means of achieving a medical termination, which is in essence an alternative to the surgical termination? That decision is implicit in this debate. If this bill, which I support, is passed and if we say yes now, then there is a preliminary green light, on ethical grounds, to the extension of the right to a medical or chemical termination if the Therapeutic Goods Administration approves the drug.

I support that approval. I support that ethical position. I do that for three reasons. Firstly, because it provides an option of privacy, so that a woman, if she chooses to seek a termination, need not necessarily do so in a hospital environment, which is a public environment. There are many reasons why a woman may choose to seek privacy. I do not wish to impose myself between a woman and her right to choose privacy if she decides that she needs a termination. There are many ways in which the procurement of a termination in a public hospital may compromise a woman’s privacy, but that is a matter for each to choose. If medical termination through the use of the drug RU486 is allowed, that option is open.

The second reason why I support in principle the extension of the general termination methods to include medical termination is that there are many women who are concerned about the possibility of surgical damage. I am not in a position to judge whether that is founded or not founded, but I am in a position to say that that is their right to choose such methods if the Therapeutic Goods Administration believes that it is a safe method.

The third reason why I support the potential extension of termination to include medical or chemical termination is that there are many women who may be at significant risk if they undergo anaesthesia. That is another reason why this may well, depending on the circumstances, be a safer option, but again subject to the Therapeutic Goods Administration’s views.

In that situation my view on the philosophy is that the choice of method should be a matter for a woman, her family and her doctor, subject of course to the views of the most competent body in Australia that that is a safe method and a safe process appropriate for Australia. I say this, however, with the firm and absolute belief that we do have a duty to do whatever we possibly can to decrease the number of terminations in Australia, but not to do that by restricting access either to the general right or to a particular method but by decreasing the number of unwanted pregnancies.

I note that in my own electorate of Flinders an organisation called Core of Life run by two former midwives has been engaged in teenage sex education and information. The result of that has been that the Mornington Peninsula has seen a decrease in teen pregnancy of 50 per cent. That is the surest way to decrease the number of terminations. This project, I am pleased to say, with the support of the former Minister for Family and Community Services, Senator Kay Patterson, was funded to the extent of $600,000 to take the program around Victoria and hopefully around Australia. I submit to the House that the Core of Life organisation and the decrease in teen pregnancy resulting from it is precisely the kind of example we need of what should happen around Australia on a more extended and broader basis as a means of decreasing the number of terminations.

The final question is whether, if you agree to the extension of a method in principle, parliament is relinquishing sovereignty by passing this bill. Parliament is the sovereign law-making body under our Constitution. I respect that role, and it is a great honour to be part of that process. But I respectfully reject and disagree with the argument presented by some, and I acknowledge the Prime Minister’s position here, that the bill in some way disenfranchises parliament. I respectfully submit that that is wrong for two reasons. First, the decision we take today and this week is not a decision once and for all. If the bill passes, it will represent the second change of law and the third position of parliament on this issue in a decade. We will not bind future parliaments with our decision today, but we are engaged right now in an absolute exercise of parliamentary sovereignty.

This brings me to my second reason for rejecting the idea that the passage of this bill would in some way diminish parliamentary sovereignty. The parliament at this moment is in the process of making a choice about whether it believes the drug is ethical if the Therapeutic Goods Administration subsequently finds it is safe. It may make that decision in one of three ways. Firstly, it may decide now, this moment, this week, and in so doing pre-authorise the extension of the drug, if the Therapeutic Goods Administration finds that it is a safe method. Secondly, the parliament may make its decision after the assessment of the Therapeutic Goods Administration is available. In other words, the parliament may make its decision available afterwards. Thirdly—and this is the current option—it may delegate the decision to the minister. With the greatest respect to the minister, I disagree with that. Because of the very public nature and concerns of this debate, the decision should not rest with any one individual.

This brings me to my conclusion. Should we predetermine the ethical question before—and I believe that is not the best option—or after the TGA has authorised an extension of medical termination? Either way I support the extension of the notion of medical termination on principle. But ultimately I believe that the best time for the parliament to assess the ethics is after, rather than before, the Therapeutic Goods Administration has made a final determination. For that reason, I support the Laming amendment. However, if the Laming amendment is not successful, I will have no hesitation in supporting the bill in its unamended form. Ultimately, I support the principles in this bill. I support the notion of extension of medical termination in addition to surgical termination. I will support this bill through the Laming amendment or, if that is unsuccessful, through supporting the bill in its unamended form.

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