House debates

Monday, 21 November 2011

Committees

Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity Committee; Report

10:15 am

Photo of Russell MathesonRussell Matheson (Macarthur, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

In supporting the member for Fremantle, firstly I would like to thank the hard work of the committee secretariat as well as other members on the committee and those organisations that took the time and effort to put in submissions. There have been a number of important recommendations that have arisen from this report, including that an integrity testing program be introduced for certain Commonwealth law enforcement agencies. In the report, the committee recommended that an integrity testing program should initially apply to law enforcement agencies within the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity's jurisdiction. This recommendation would bring Commonwealth agencies into alignment with the majority of state law enforcement agencies with regard to integrity testing.

Another important recommendation is No. 3, chapter 4, paragraph 20, where the committee has recommended that the Integrity Commissioner and heads of relevant law enforcement agencies be given the ability to authorise integrity tests in the course of investigations into corruption issues. This important recommendation will enable targeted integrity testing to be carried out and will give the Integrity Commissioner and heads of agencies the ability to use more covert and strategic methods to investigate corruption issues within their organisations. The committee has also recommended allowing covert policing powers to be used for the purpose of targeted integrity testing of an officer or employee of a law enforcement agency, or group thereof, where there are allegations or suspicions of corrupt behaviour.

In chapter 4.63 the committee recommends that the Commonwealth Ombudsman be given the ability to inspect the use of integrity testing and associated covert policing powers and report to the parliament on agencies' compliance with legislative requirements as necessary. In chapter 4.65 the committee recommends that the Integrity Commissioner be notified of any integrity test that is conducted by an agency within its jurisdiction as well as the outcome of such tests. In chapter 4.68 the committee recommends that ACLEI provide a private briefing to the PJC-ACLEI on an annual basis on the number and outcome of integrity tests conducted.

Integrity testing is a term used to describe a range of activities designed to assess compliance with the integrity requirements of an office. It involves putting an individual in a simulated situation where corrupt conduct can occur and observing the individual's behaviour. Such a test can be arranged on a targeted basis as a result of specific intelligence about an individual or group or on a random basis in order to provide a general deterrent. Targeted integrity testing of police officers occurs in a number of jurisdictions including New York City, Hong Kong, London and in most Australian states, although not currently at the Commonwealth level. The defining factor in integrity testing is the simulated nature of the scenario in which an individual is placed. This differentiates it from traditional anticorruption investigation tools which seek to substantiate corrupt behaviour that has already occurred.

Integrity testing can be used to target behaviour ranging from minor misconduct to serious corruption. Results of individual tests can be used for training purposes, for disciplinary purposes, or to found criminal charges depending on the results and testing scenarios. It is possible to produce integrity testing policies to create a deterrence effect based on the prospect that wrongdoing is more likely to be detected than not. Certain scenarios may be used to specifically test behaviours that may constitute corruption or to test for lower level wrongdoing. These behaviours, if left unchecked, could contribute to a poor ethical culture and lead to corrupt conduct becoming widespread.

Testing can be conducted on a targeted or random basis. A targeted integrity testing regime is intelligence based and targets individuals or groups suspected of engaging in corrupt conduct. For a targeted test to occur, some kind of trigger is required such as a complaint, an allegation, an identified pattern of behaviour or some other basis that gives rise to suspicion. Integrity testing can also be conducted on a random basis where individuals or groups are tested in the absence of any suspicion of corruption. Under this system all individuals within the organisation have an equal chance of being subject to a test.

When examining integrity testing the committee sought to consider the various integrity testing models and include the advantages and disadvantages of random and targeted integrity testing, effectiveness as a corruption deterrent and possible entrapment issues. The committee also examined in depth the legislative and administrative framework required to underpin an integrity testing regime as well as investigate the Commonwealth agencies to whom an integrity testing regime could apply. The committee also explored the potential role of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity in integrity testing.

I move now to chapter 3, 'Previous findings in relation to integrity testing'. Integrity testing is a resource-intensive exercise. It requires the creation of detailed, highly realistic scenarios that are tailored to the circumstances of each particular case. Preparing a test can be a costly proposition. In addition, specialist teams may be required to assist with the execution of a test, including undercover operatives often seconded from other agencies, and surveillance or telecommunication intercept capabilities. I note in chapter 3, point 18, that the Australian Federal Police informed the committee that the costs for an agency conducting an integrity testing regime would vary depending, for example, on whether the regime was fully internal or fully outsourced.

Another serious issue raised in this report is the negative effects on morale and capacity to act within agencies where random testing programs in particular are implemented. It is very important that any integrity testing program carefully balances the positive anticorruption benefits against possible unintended negative effects such as undermining trust relationships between employee and employer.

I highly commend the adoption of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity report entitled Inquiry into integrity testing and the recommendations contained therein.

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